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Abstract—User association logs play an important role in
wireless network research. One concern of sharing such logs with
other researchers, however, is that they pose potential privacy
risks for the network users. Today, the common practice in
sanitizing these logs before releasing them to the public is to
anonymize users’ sensitive information, such as their devices’
MAC addresses and their exact association locations. In this
work, we aim to study whether such sanitization measures are
sufficient to protect user privacy. By simulating an adversary’s
role, we propose a novel type of correlation attack in which the
adversary uses the anonymized association log to build signatures
against each user, and when combined with auxiliary information,
such signatures can help to identify users within the anonymized
log. Using a user association log that contains more than four
thousand users and millions of association records, we demon-
strate that this attack technique, under certain circumstances, is
able to pinpoint the victim’s identity exactly with a probability as
high as 70%, or narrow it down to a set of 20 candidates with a
probability close to 100%. We further evaluate the effectiveness of
standard anonymization techniques, including generalization and
perturbation, in mitigating correlation attacks; our experimental
results reveal only limited success of these methods, suggesting
that more thorough treatment is needed when anonymizing
wireless user association logs before public release.
I. INTRODUCTION
To preserve users’ privacy, a network trace publisher must
sanitize the traces before sharing them with the public.
Although many network sanitization techniques have been
proposed and developed, recent research has shown that these
techniques provide limited protection against user (or host) re-
identification attacks. Existing sanitization techniques usually
deal with explicit sensitive fields in the dataset, such as
IP/MAC addresses, port number, and TCP/UDP payloads,
but ignore implicit information that can be potentially ex-
tracted and used to identify an anonymized user (or host).
For an enterprise-wide network with thousands of users,
privacy analysis on wired network traces has been widely
studied to understand the severity of some potential trace-
sharing risks [1], [2]. However, similar research is scarce for
enterprise-wide, large-scale wireless networks [3], [4]. As the
edge of the Internet is increasingly becoming wireless, and
because wireless networks have some unique characteristics,
such as user mobility, it is important to evaluate privacy threats
posed due to shared wireless network traces.
In this paper, we conduct privacy analysis on one of the sim-
plest wireless network traces, a user association log collected
from a large-scale WLAN. Such a log keeps a record of each
association and disassociation event between users’ wireless
devices and the network’s access points (APs). Compared
to other semantically rich wireless-network traces, we would
hope the simplicity of the user association log could make
it more resistant to potential privacy risks. We consider the
following two questions: 1) Using only the “insensitive” infor-
mation in an anonymized user association log, is it possible to
build a signature for each user, such that when these signatures
are combined with auxiliary information, an adversary can
distinguish users within the anonymized log. 2) If a privacy
breach is possible, how effective are traditional mitigation
approaches in preventing an adversary from building such
signatures?
In a nutshell, we make three major contributions in this
work. First, we simulate the role of an adversary and propose a
“correlation attack” – a method based on Conditional Random
Field (CRF) – that can be used to breach user privacy from a
released WLAN user association log. Second, we use extensive
experiments to demonstrate the effectiveness of the CRF-
based correlation attack. Using an anonymized campus-wide
WLAN user association log with more than four thousand
users and millions of user association records, and a short-
term observation of the victim’s association activities, we
show that the CRF-based correlation attack, under certain
circumstances, can reveal the victim’s identity in the released
dataset with a probability as high as 70%, or narrow down the
victim’s identity among 20 candidates with a probability close
to 100%. Third, we evaluate the effectiveness of standard san-
itization techniques, including generalization and perturbation,
in mitigating the proposed correlation attack; the results reveal
only limited success of these methods, suggesting that more
thorough treatment is needed when anonymizing wireless user
association logs before the public release.
II. RELATED WORK
To share network traces while preserving privacy, data
publishers usually define sanitization policies according to
their specific privacy concerns. These policies determine which
sanitization methods to apply and how [5]. Due to the intrinsic
complexity of network trace sanitization, however, recent
research has revealed that there are few, if any, available
network-trace sanitization schemes that can provide a water-
tight guarantee under the worst-case analysis. These works
often mimic the role of an adversary that tries to launch a
de-sanitization attack against the sanitized trace [1], [2]. For a
comprehensive survey of state-of-art network trace sanitization
and de-sanitization research, we refer interested readers our
previous work [6].
In the domain of wireless networks, many physical-device-
fingerprinting techniques could potentially be used to launch
de-sanitization attacks [7], [8]. Because most of these tech-
niques work by monitoring unique variations in protocol
behaviors, such as those seen across different vendors or
device-driver implementations, they often require very-high-
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requirements greatly limit their applicability for de-sanitization
on most types of released traces. Pang’s work [9] relies on
much more abundant trace semantics than our work and has
only been evaluated with much smaller wireless network traces
than the one we used. Most close to this work, Kumar and
Helmy have recently shown that it is possible to breach privacy
from WLAN user association logs [4]. Their attack model
assumes that the adversary can inject data into the wireless
network during the trace collection or has some out-of-band
information such as the victim’s academic major and gender.
The attack discussed in this paper, however, does not require
these assumptions.
III. WLAN USER ASSOCIATION LOGS
At Dartmouth College, we have been monitoring the
campus-wide WLAN network usage since 2001. As of January
2010, this WLAN network consists of over 1300 Aruba APs
that provide 54Mbps coverage to the entire campus. These
Aruba APs are connected with and controlled by a small set
of Aruba Mobility Controllers. We poll every controller every
5 minutes using the SNMP protocol and receive replies that
contain a list of users associated with each AP. After process-
ing these replies, each row of the resulting user association
log, which we call a user association record, has 4 comma-
separated fields: the MAC address of the wireless card, the
name of the AP that the wireless card has connected with,
and the start and the end POSIX timestamp of this connection.
The following is a snippet of the user association log that
we extract from the SNMP information (it shows anonymized
MAC addresses to protect user privacy):
001d4f3bc496,14.5.1, 1251690285,1251691544
0021e9082bfd,142.6.1,1251689384,1251691544
There are a few things worth noting. First, although it is
possible that a wireless card may have been used in multiple
devices or a device has been used by multiple people, we
assume that such cases are rare in our dataset. Hence in
this paper we use a “wireless card” and a “network user”
(or a “user”) interchangeably. Second, because the Aruba
Mobility Controller only generates the start timestamp for
each connection and we poll the controller every 5 minutes,
the connection’s end timestamp is only an estimated value,
whose error is therefore bounded by 5 minutes. Third, we
use a hierarchical naming scheme for APs in the dataset. For
an AP named x.y.z, x is its building number, y is its floor
number, and z is its serial number within the floor.
Sanitization. We use one-to-one mapping function to re-
name the MAC addresses in the original dataset. Hence,
the anonymized MAC addresses in the sanitized dataset do
not have any physical meaning and thus are only symbolic
names; a similar sanitization scheme has been used in other
work [4]. By leveraging the hierarchical naming scheme, we
truncate an AP’s name according to different sanitization
levels. For example, if we want to only keep building and
floor information, we truncate the AP’s name from x.y.z to
x.y.
IV. THREAT MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Complying with Narayanan’s definition of privacy
breach [10], the threat we study here is whether the limited
insensitive information left in a sanitized association log
could still form implicit signatures for individual users.
These implicit signatures, when combined with auxiliary
information, may provide the adversary the knowledge that
the sanitization process has aimed to protect, such as whether
an anonymized ID in the released dataset corresponds to a
specific user. We make the following three assumptions in
our threat model.
Assumption 1: The adversary has access to a sanitized
WLAN user association log Ls, which is released to the public
by a trace publisher. There are Ns users in this association
log. All users’ real MAC addresses are anonymized in Ls as
follows: during the trace publisher’s sanitization process, each
real MAC address has been replaced with a new identifier
IDi (1 ≤ i ≤ Ns) according to some one-to-one one-way
mapping function. Hence, given an anonymized MAC address
IDi, the adversary cannot find the real MAC address that
is mapped to IDi. The AP’s name can be either preserved
or truncated. The rest of the fields, such as the start and
end timestamp of each connection, are preserved during the
sanitization process.
Assumption 2: The adversary knows a sequence of associ-
ation records about a victim user’s device. This sequence of
records, Q, need not be collected during the same time period
as Ls (otherwise the problem will be trivial). It is important to
note that the information provided in Q can be rather coarse.
For example, the adversary may only need to know which
buildings the victim has visited rather than which exact APs
the victim has associated with.
Assumption 3: The adversary knows that the sanitized
dataset Ls must contain the victim’s AP association records. In
many cases, Ls is published at an organization level (e.g., by
a university) and thus contains complete AP association logs
of the organization’s wireless users. Hence, if the adversary
knows that the victim was a member of the organization when
Ls was collected, it is easy for him to know that Ls should
contain the victim’s AP association records.
Given the three assumptions in the adversarial model, the
(exact) correlation attack problem is then formulated as fol-
lows: given Ls and Q, which anonymized identity IDi (1 ≤
i ≤ Ns) in Ls has also generatedQ? In practice, however, due
to incomplete data for training or inference, or some intra- and
inter-user association activity variations, finding an algorithm
to solve the exact correlation attack problem is difficult or
even impossible. In this work, we consider a relaxed and more
practical version of this problem. The (relaxed) correlation
attack problem is formulated as follows: given Ls and Q,
which subset of anonymized identities would contain the one
that generated Q with high probability?
V. ALGORITHM DESCRIPTION
In the previous section, we formulate correlation attack as
a classification problem, in which the two key components
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Fig. 1. Represent each user’s association log as association activity template.
TABLE I
FEATURES OF AN ASSOCIATION ACTIVITY VECTOR
Feature
name
Meaning Value Comments
duration Adjusted
connection duration
Integer Normalized [11]
day of
week
Day of the week of
this record
Enum. type, from
Monday to Sunday To representperiodic
patterns [12]startingtime
Time slot of a day
of this record
Enum. type, from
Midnight to Night
previous
AP
The AP in the pre-
vious record
String, AP’s name
To represent
context
informationg [13],
[14]
next-to-
previous
AP
The AP in the next-
to-previous record
next AP The AP in the next
record
are feature representation and the learning algorithm. We use
association activity templates to represent user association logs
and employ CRF as the learning algorithm.
A. Data Representation
We propose a new approach that uses association activity
templates to represent user association logs. In this method,
we first split the user’s association log into day-to-day pieces
and then for each day build an individual association activity
template, because human activities often exhibit regularities
associated with days of the week. An association activity
template is a collection of association activity tags and their
corresponding association activity vectors. As shown in Fig-
ure 1, the association activity tag is the name of the visited
AP. Each element in an association activity vector is called
a feature. In the current implementation, we let an activity
vector have six features: duration, day of week, starting time,
previous AP, next to previous AP, and next AP. Table I explains
these features.
B. Algorithm Procedure
As an overview of the correlation attack, we describe the
attack algorithm in this section and defer the introduction to
CRF to Section V-C.
Step 1. For each user in Ls, split his/her association log
into day-to-day pieces and represent each day’s log using an
association activity template as described in Section V-A.
Step 2. Feed each user’s association activity templates into
a linear-chain CRF to model this user’s association behavior.
As there are Ns users in Ls, we build Ns CRF models. The
input fed to a CRF model is a sequence of association activity
vectors (Figure 1) and the output is a sequence of association
activity tags, which are actually AP names. Let CRFi(V)
denote the output from the i-th user’s CRF model, where
1 ≤ i ≤ Ns and V denotes the sequence of association activity
vectors fed to the CRF model.
Step 3. For the observed user association record Q, we
preprocess it as described above to obtain an association
activity template T . Let VT and GT denote the sequence of
association activity vectors and the sequence of association
activity tags in template T , respectively.
Step 4. We feed VT to all CRF models trained in Step
2 and count the number of tags that overlap between GT and
CRFi(VT ) (1 ≤ i ≤ Ns), a score we denote wi. The intuition
applied here is that the victim’s CRF model is more likely to
produce correct activity association tags from her observed
activity association vectors in Q, and therefore score wi is
higher than the others if IDi is the victim’s identifier in the
released user association log.
Step 5. We sort all users based on score wi in non-increasing
order and the algorithm outputs this sorted list.
Ideally the top identifier on the sorted list should be
treated as the sole candidate that generated the observed
user association sequence Q. In practice, however, due to
incomplete data for training or inference, or some intra- and
inter-user association activity variations, the top identifier may
not correspond to the victim who produced Q. As mentioned
earlier, we tackle the relaxed correlation attack problem instead
and thus use a small number of top identifiers on the sorted
list. Clearly, from the attacker’s perspective, the smaller the
number of top identifiers needed to include the victim’s, the
more successful his attack.
C. Conditional Random Field
Let X = (X1, X2, ..., Xn) denote a random variable of an
observed sequence, each element of which has k features. In
our problem, a realization of X is a sequence of association
activity vectors with the six features described in Table I. Let
Y denote a random variable of a label sequence. A label
here is actually an association activity tag that indicates an
AP name. According to Figure 1, each association activity
vector corresponds to an association activity tag. Hence, given
an observed sequence of X (i.e., sequence VT in Step 3 of
the algorithm shown in Section V-B), we need to produce
a label sequence for it. It is thus a task of assigning label
sequences to observation sequences, which is common to
many applications in bioinformatics, computational linguistics
and speed recognition [15], [16].
The Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is known to be a pop-
ular generative model that characterizes the joint distribution
p(X,Y ) directly [16]. The challenge facing HMM is that it
has to model the entire set of observation sequences p(X)
explicitly, which is intractable in our case (and many other
domains) due to the limited amount of data to estimate a
full-fledged p(X) and the correlation between the features in
X (the features in the association activity vector). The CRF
method, in contrast, eliminates the necessity of knowing p(X)
4by building models to predict label sequences Y conditional
on observation sequences X . Hence, CRF is indifferent to the
dependence among features in X because X is now treated as
given (i.e., a condition). Because CRF models the conditional
probability p(Y |X) instead of the joint distribution p(X,Y ),
it is a discriminative approach rather than a generative one.
In this work, we used CRFsuite [17], a linear-chain CRF
implementation for parameter estimation and inference. Due
to limited space, we refer interested readers to the literature
for more thorough treatment on the topic of CRF [18].
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We use 62-day user association log collected at Dartmouth
College between January 4, 2010 and March 6, 2010, in this
evaluation. We filter out transient users who were active in
fewer than 45 days during this 62-day period, and the resulting
dataset still contained 2,450,903 (79.67%) user association
records with 4,285 distinct users and 1,364 distinct APs. The
62-day user association log is partitioned into 10 bins of
approximately the same length for each user. In the j-th round
(1 ≤ j ≤ 10), we use the j-th bin of each user’s association
records as the testing dataset (Lu) and the remaining nine as
the training dataset (Ls) to build the CRF models. The results
shown below are the 10-round averages.
The Minimum Size of Candidate Identifier Set (MSCIS)
is our metric to measure the attack efficiency. Consider the
relaxed correlation attack problem with a sanitized user asso-
ciation dataset Ls and an observed sequence of AP association
records Q. For each IDi where 1 ≤ i ≤ Ns in Ls, we
compute score wi according to Step 4 in the CRF-based
method. Suppose that IDj is the user ID of the victim who
generated Q. The MSCIS is defined as the number of user
IDs whose scores are no smaller than wj . MSCIS establishes
an upper bound on how many candidate user IDs need be
considered in order to contain the victim’s user ID in the
sanitized dataset. Note that if a user has the same score as the
victim’s (i.e., wj), his ID should also be counted into MSCIS.
To set up a baseline case for comparison, we developed a
simple distance-based method described as follows:
Step 1. For each user in Ls, we build a time vector each
day that contains how much time this user spent at each AP.
Step 2. Similarly, we compute a set of daily time vectors
for each user in Lu.
Step 3. For each user in Lu, we compute the Euclidean
distance between each of her time vectors and every user’s
time vectors in Ls, to obtain an average score for every user
in Ls.
Step 4. For each user in Lu, we sort the scores derived from
Step 3 in non-decreasing order to obtain a sorted list of user
IDs in Ls, then compute the MSCIS for each user in Lu.
Figure 2 compares the results of the CRF-based method
and the distance-based method. The sanitization is done by
anonymizing only the MAC addresses but leaving the other
fields intact. When the length of Q is 5-6 days, the CRF-
based method significantly outperforms the distance-based
method in attack efficiency: 73.2% of the 4,285 users can
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Fig. 2. Relationship between the attack performance and the amount of
auxiliary information.
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Fig. 3. Effectiveness of generalization-based mitigation against the proposed
correlation attack.
be pinpointed exactly from Ls; for 99.7% of the users, their
MSCIS is no more than 20. Hence, using the CRF-based
method, the adversary could almost surely narrow down the
victim’s possible user ID into a set of 20 candidates from an
anonymized dataset with more than 4,000 users. By tuning the
length of Q to different values (from 5-6 days to 2 or 3 days),
we show how the amount of auxiliary knowledge affects the
attack efficiency. Clearly, reducing the auxiliary knowledge
available to the attacker (shorter Q) degrades the performance
of the attack. However, even in the worst case here that the
length of Q is only two days, the adversary still can pinpoint
her identity exactly from Ls with probability 61.7%, and for
98.5% of the users, he can narrow down her identity in Ls
to only 20 candidates. From the attacker’s perspective, this
is favorable because he needs to know a victim’s association
activities for only a short period to launch the correlation
attack effectively.
VII. MITIGATION STRATEGIES
As a network trace publisher ourselves and as the host
of the CRAWDAD [19], we are concerned about how effec-
tively standard sanitization measures can prevent such privacy
breaches.
A. Generalization
Recall that the AP-naming scheme in the user association
logs uses a hierarchical structure: building ID, floor level, and
AP serial number. We consider two generalization schemes
here: one keeping only the building information of each AP,
and the other keeping both the building ID and the floor level.
The results on these two anonymized datasets, together with
results from CRF without any generalization, are depicted in
Figure 3. All the experiments in Section VII work on the same
sanitized dataset Ls and unsanitized dataset Lu (with 5-6 days)
as those in the previous section.
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It is clear that applying generalization-based anonymization
techniques helps mitigate correlation attacks. On the other
hand, because keeping only the AP’s building information
is the best we can do to generalize AP names, we can see
only limited effectiveness of generalization-based schemes in
mitigating correlation attacks on user association logs.
B. Perturbation
Based on the characteristics of the user association logs,
we consider two perturbation methods: spatial perturbation
and temporal perturbation. The spatial perturbation method
changes the AP information in the original dataset as follows.
Let Si denote the sequence of user IDi’s AP association
records, sorted in increasing order of starting timestamps. For
each record Rj in Si, we change the AP in Rj to the AP
in Rj−1 with probability 15%, change it to the AP in Rj+1
with probability 15%, or keep it intact with probability 70%.
The temporal perturbation method changes the start and end
timestamps in the original dataset by adding Gaussian noise
with mean 0 and standard deviation 3600 seconds to these two
timestamps. The effectiveness of both methods in mitigating
correlation attacks is illustrated in Figure 4.
Considering the results in Figures 3 and 4, we conclude that
for all the mitigation techniques evaluated, their effectiveness
in mitigating CRF-based correlation attacks is rather limited.
Although adding more noise in the perturbation-based methods
can further constrain the adversary’s capability in launching
correlation attacks, it may also damage the usability of the
released user association datasets.
VIII. CONCLUSION
User association logs collected from real-world WLANs
have played an important role in understanding these networks.
Sharing them with the public, however, poses potential risks
to the privacy of the users involved. In this work, we show
that people’s association behaviors form implicit signatures
for individual users. When combined with auxiliary informa-
tion, such signatures can help reveal the true identities of
anonymized IDs in a sanitized WLAN user association log. On
a pessimistic note, standard anonymization techniques, such
as generalization and perturbation, are unable to mitigate such
CRF-based correlation attack effectively. The results from this
work call for a more thorough study of potential privacy risks
when wireless user association logs are shared with the public.
For a more complete presentation of the results in this paper,
see our technical report [20]. A preliminary, short version of
this paper appeared in the ACM MobiCom S3 workshop [3].
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